Leitura do dia - The Case For Intervening In Bankers' Pay

The Case For Intervening In Bankers' Pay
JOHN THANASSOULIS
July 30, 2011

Abstract
This paper studies the default risk of banks generated by investment and remuneration pressures. Competing banks prefer to pay their banking sta in bonuses and not in fixed
wages as risk sharing on the remuneration bill is valuable. Competition for bankers generates a
negative externality driving up market levels of banker remuneration and so rival banks' default
risk. Optimal nancial regulation involves an appropriately structured limit on the proportion of
the balance sheet used for bonuses. However stringent bonus caps are value destroying, default
risk enhancing and cannot be optimal for regulators who control only a small number of banks.
Keywords: Bonuses, default risk, competition for bankers, fi nancial regulation.
JEL Classi cation: G21, G34.

Recentemente Nassim Taleb propos o fim do pagamento de bônus no setor financeiro como forma de evitar crises bancárias. Como a maioria das análises do Taleb, é baseada em puro sentimento e pouca análise. O artigo acima, a sair no Journal of Finance, mostra que esta decisão é bem mais complexa.